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 1 
Introduction: Hungary’s Red Sludge Disaster 
  
On Monday October 4th the walls of a reservoir containing waste product at the alumina 
plant Ajkai Timfoldgyar Zrt in western Hungary ruptured sending 700,000 cubic meters of toxic 
red sludge pouring onto the villages of Kolontár, Devecser and Somlóvásárhely, prompting the 
Hungarian government to declare a state of emergency. The spill covered about 40 square 
kilometers, killed 9, injured 120, and forced the government to evacuate over 400 people.1 There 
were also broader fears that the chemicals from the red sludge would seep into the nearby 
streams and tributaries that run into the Danube, the second longest river in Europe, turning a 
local disaster into an international one as it flowed downstream towards Croatia, Serbia, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Moldova, before letting out into the Black Sea.2 This disaster 
has prompted a number of questions regarding accountability in terms of the causes of the 
disaster as well as responses by relevant actors. This paper will provide a theoretical discussion 
of various forms of accountability, applying them to the recent industrial disaster in Hungary. It 
will evaluate the Hungarian government’s actions along those guidelines, outlining its successes 
in managing the disaster itself, how the historical failures of previous governments to regulate 
industry mires the process of determining the current government’s accountability in that regard, 
along with its missteps in the process of establishing criminal accountability for the disaster. The 
actions of the government are further juxtaposed to the multiple failures of the company 
responsible for maintaining the reservoir. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 (2010, October 05). Hungary declares emergency after red sludge spill. Reuters.  
2
 (2010, October 06). Huge ammonia spill paints towns red as a state of emergency is declared in three counties. 
Duna Televizio. 
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Disaster as Competency Test  
Mark Bovens utilizes a conceptual framework that analyzes accountability in terms of the 
specific social relationship between an actor and a forum. An accountability relationship between 
actor and forum has three component parts. The first involves the obligation of the actor to 
explain and justify their conduct to a forum. The second entails the process of the actor 
providing information, answering questions, and giving explanations to justify their actions or 
inactions. In the third, the forum provides a judgment of the actor along with commensurate 
sanctions or rewards.3  
One specific accountability relationship that becomes apparent in the case of the Hungary 
disaster is that which exists between the government and the public, what Bovens calls political 
accountability. While the principal (the citizenry) elects the agent (the government) to act on its 
behalf, the agent is in turn accountable to the principal for its actions. The government is the 
actor, and the people constitute the forum to which government is accountable, which then 
reserve the right to pass judgment. After judgment, the sanction or reward is often determined 
through the electoral process. “The mechanism of political accountability [thus] operates 
precisely in the opposite direction to the delegation of sovereignty.”4 Accountability to the 
people serves as a check on the power they entrust to government, reaffirming the people’s 
sovereignty over government. In an adaptation of Bovens’ conceptual framework applied to 
disaster risk reduction (DRR) within the Latin American and Caribbean context, Olson et al. 
delve into the relationship between disasters and government accountability. First and foremost, 
emphasis should be placed on their assertion that disasters are a result of the intersection of 
hazard events such as earthquakes and hurricanes, or toxic red sludge spills in this case, and the 
                                                 
3
 Bovens, 2006, pp. 9-10. 
4
 Bovens, 2006, p. 16. 
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vulnerabilities to them that exist in the particular communities they affect. DRR is thus the 
process of reducing vulnerability to hazard events in human communities. Therefore, when 
disasters happen, questions regarding the failure of government to reduce vulnerability inevitably 
surface.5  
Farazmand contends that accountability is particularly critical when it comes to managing 
crisis. Governments are not only expected to take steps to prevent disasters, but when they do 
occur, they must act urgently to save lives and property, assuring the security of their citizens. 
Government management of an emergency therefore becomes a test of its general competency. 
Today this test is of even greater significance as legitimacy and securing the people’s trust has 
become the centerpiece of modern representative democracy. The failure of administrations to 
respond effectively to disaster situations often leads to a withdrawal of public support and 
inevitably removal from power.6 Public accountability promotes the acceptance of government 
authority, enhancing government legitimacy by allowing them to explain and justify their actions 
to the public, with the public maintaining its right to ask questions and state opinions.7 
An important component of a government’s management of a disaster is its ability to 
communicate effectively. Governments are held accountable for their success or failure in 
communicating because this often plays a fundamental role in determining their ability to 
mitigate the amount of hardship faced by their citizens during disaster. Not only must 
government be able to communicate well amongst its various appendages, but also, the people 
must be kept informed of developments related to the disaster so that they can know that 
government is acting as it was elected to. Effective communication by the government is also 
needed so the population can take whatever necessary actions are expected of them to ensure 
                                                 
5
 Olson et al., 2011, pp. 62-63. 
6
 Farazmand, 2007, p. 149. 
7
 Bovens, 2006, p. 27. 
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their safety. Governments are judged in terms of their agency, the extent to which they are 
proactive in crisis communication, and the degree to which their actions are transparent to the 
public. The government thus becomes a source of stability in the midst of crisis. According to 
Garnett and Kouzmin, the Bush administration’s response during Hurricane Katrina is a poignant 
example of the role that government communication plays in protecting the public from disaster. 
They believe that the immense suffering endured during and after Katrina was as much a product 
of multiple communication disasters as it was a result of the natural disaster itself. 
Communication failures prevented both the recognition that a crisis was emerging, as well as 
hampering the response to the devastation left in the wake of the hurricane.8 Olson et al. note a 
similar communications failure during the tsunami event caused by the 27 February 2010 
magnitude 8.8 Chilean earthquake. As communication broke down between the Chilean Navy’s 
Hydrographic and Oceanographic Service (SHOA) and the Ministry of the Interior’s Office of 
National Emergencies (ONEMI), the country’s tsunami warning system was cancelled only an 
hour after the major earthquake struck just of its coast, leaving many of Chile’s small coastal 
towns in the dark about the threat facing them.9 With 350 people dead in the town of 
Constitución alone,10 the public cried out for answers.11  
 
Hungary’s Government Responds to Crisis Test 
From the very beginning the Hungarian government’s actions depict an understanding of 
its formal responsibility to act urgently, as well as its informal obligation to keep the public 
informed. The fact that only 9 people were fatally wounded in such a massive industrial disaster 
                                                 
8
 Garnett and Kouzmin, 2007, p. 171-172. 
9
 Olson et al., 2011, p. 65. 
10
 Padgett, T. (2010, March 01). Chile: prepared for the quake but not the tsunami. Time. 
11
 (2010, March 06). Chile sacks oceanography chief over failure to issue tsunami warnings. The Telegraph. 
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speaks volumes to the level of coordination by the various responding agencies. Nowhere in the 
media were there major criticisms of the government regarding its immediate actions. The 
National Ambulance Service had 23 units on the ground and 4 helicopters assisting in the search 
and rescue operation. That very evening, it treated 116 of the injured, while the more seriously 
wounded were airlifted to hospitals in the capital, Budapest. Early the next day, the Budapest 
Public Area Maintenance Company sent five tanker trucks of drinking water to the area to meet 
the needs of the population since their water supply had been contaminated by the red sludge.12 
The disaster also displayed the functioning of the country’s disaster warning system. 
Immediately that afternoon the highest alert level was established, warning communities along 
nearby creeks and rivers most susceptible to contamination. As it became evident that the spill 
placed the Danube at risk, the government extended a warning to countries along the major river 
using the AEWS/PIAC alert system of the Danube Protection Convention.13  
Also impressive on the part of the Hungarian government was its immediate attempts to 
stop the red sludge from contaminating the Danube River, one of the largest rivers in continental 
Europe. Instantly following the spill, disaster management experts began applying various 
chemical treatments to the tributary that flowed into the Danube to neutralize the alkalinity of the 
sludge, while also using techniques to slow its flow in order to recover the heavy metals being 
transported down-stream.14 According to the Executive Secretary of the International 
Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR), the disaster is likely to have only 
minor international consequences, because the measures taken in Hungary seemed successful in 
                                                 
12
 (2010, October 5). Sludge flood—Four dead include children. Retrieved from http://redsludge.bm.hu/?paged=9. 
5:26 pm.  
13
 (2010, October 7). Information on the accidental pollution and related mitigation measures of the ‘red mud spill at 
Ajka.’ Retrieved from http://redsludge.bm.hu/?paged=9.  
14
 (2010, October 7). Information on the state of the rivers in Hungary. Retrieved from 
http://redsludge.bm.hu/?p=21#more-21.  
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lowering the sludge’s pH level and slowing its spread. In 1998 the countries along the Danube 
founded the ICPDR to protect it from such environmental cataclysms. In this instance, Hungary 
successfully carried out its obligation to alert the other countries along the river, thus validating 
the effectiveness of the regional early warning system.15 Beyond this action, the Hungarian 
government also placed heavy emphasis on monitoring the water supplies of cities not in the 
immediate vicinity of the disaster, ensuring that they remained unpolluted, and thus safe to drink.  
Of particular significance were steps taken by the government to examine the reservoir 
after the initial breach to determine whether or not a threat still persisted. The Hungarian 
Minister for the Environment, Zoltán Illés, after discovering that a total collapse of the reservoir 
was not out of the realm of possibilities, shifted the government’s efforts away from securing the 
earlier breach towards building a dike around the reservoir to contain the rest of the toxic sludge 
should the walls completely fail.16 About 800 residents remaining in the nearest town, Kolontar, 
were immediately evacuated once the new threat became apparent, while 300 soldiers, 130 
police vehicles and four trains were on standby in case 6,000 more residents nearby also became 
endangered.17   
Not only was the government’s immediate physical response to the disaster quite 
successful, its communications to the public as the disaster unfolded was also of very high 
quality. It was particularly successful in what Garnett and Kousmin call communication as 
interpersonal influence. “The interpersonal dynamics of presidents, governors, mayors, chief 
executive officers, their top advisors, and other actors involved in the crisis,” have become 
increasingly critical in how government’s are evaluated by the public. Government leadership 
                                                 
15
 (2010 October 7). Information on the state of the rivers in Hungary. Retrieved from 
http://redsludge.bm.hu/?p=21#more-21.  
16
 (2010 October 11). The reservoir at Kolontár cannot be saved. Duna Televizio. 
17
 Bilefsky, D. (2010 October 10). Fears of more red sludge in Hungary. The New York Times. 
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must engage in face-to-face interpersonal communications either at the scene of the disaster or in 
an operations center, to display to the public that it is directing action and setting the tone for 
management of the crisis.18 The very evening of the spill, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán sent 
Interior Minister Sándor Pintér to direct immediate disaster relief efforts.19 On the morning of 
October 5th, a Governmental Coordination Committee meeting was held to decide on the 
immediate reconstruction of the breached reservoir wall, clean up of the red sludge covering the 
three towns, and treatment of rivers that had been contaminated.20  
Afterwards, top government officials were dispatched to the area to show the 
governments concern and dedication to managing the disaster and insuring the public safety. 
Minister for the Environment, Zoltán Illés, was the first to arrive on the scene to assess the extent 
of the disaster and to coordinate efforts to stop the red sludge from seeping into the water table 
and eventually reaching the Danube.21 A day later, Prime Minister Orbán walked around the 
devastated area, spoke with residents, and met with experts assessing the situation, after which 
he gave a press conference to discuss what the government was doing to clean up the 
environmental devastation, help the people affected, and determine the causes of the disaster.22 
The Hungarian government also established the website redsludge.bm.hu to update the public on 
the situation and how it was handling it.23 The Junior Minister of Government Communication 
provided continuous reports on the preventive and restorative measures being taken by the 
government and its various organs, along with the condition of the rivers that were being 
                                                 
18
 Garnett and Kouzmin, 2007, p. 172-173. 
19
 (2010, October 11). “Homes, lives ruined by toxic spill.” The Budapest Times.  
20
 (2010, October 7). Information on the accidental pollution and related mitigation measures of the ‘red mud spill at 
Ajka.’ Retrieved from http://redsludge.bm.hu/?paged=9.  
21
 (2010, October 06). Huge ammonia spill paints two towns red as a state of emergency is declared in three 
counties. Duna Televizio. 
22
 (2010, October 07). Viktor Orbán visits Kolontár and Devecser to meet with locals. Duna Televizio. 
23
 (2010, October 12). Redsludge dot com. The Budapest Times. 
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contaminated.24 This transparency serves as an important prerequisite for Bovens’ notion of 
public accountability, which places emphasis on the accessibility to the general public of 
information regarding the actor’s conduct.25 According to a New York Times article, Prime 
Minister Orbán’s swift measures to take command over the crisis situation established the 
government as a Hungarian protector in the eyes of the public, forging greater national unity, and 
giving his government a needed uplift during a time of economic travail.26 
 
Failures in Government Oversight 
Perhaps where the government had its biggest failings was in not immediately knowing 
the properties of the red sludge. Initially the Hungarian Academy of Sciences made a public 
statement declaring that the waste product was nontoxic, but this was quickly proven wrong by 
succeeding events.27 According to Greenpeace, the toxin levels of the sludge were much higher 
than the government initially reported to the public, containing twenty-five times the level of 
arsenic allowed, along with high levels of mercury and chrome.28 To the media, this displayed a 
reprehensible lack of government oversight prior to the disaster. The government was expected 
to know what kinds of harmful chemicals were being stored within the country’s borders, and 
how to neutralize them if they should ever become a threat to the public safety. This gap in 
government knowledge had some particularly negative consequences for the response effort. 
During the rescue, 8 firefighters, 1 soldier, and 8 police officers suffered serious injuries, with a 
                                                 
24
 (2010, October 7). Report for the international press. Retrieved from http://redsludge.bm.hu/?paged=9. 
25
 Bovens, 2006, p. 13. 
26
 Bilefsky, D. (2010, October 11). Hungary arrests official, citing role in red sludge. The New York Times. 
27
 Dragoman, G. (2010, October 16). Seeing red in Hungary. The New York Times.  
28
 (2010, October 8). A deadly deluge. The Economist.  
Hungarian Toxic Red Sludge Spill 
 
 9 
number hospitalized as a result of working in sludge they believed to be relatively harmless.29 
This is conceivably a failure in what Bovens’ terms administrative accountability. It was the 
responsibility of various government agencies and inspectors to determine what was being stored 
in the reservoir as well as the overall safety of the structure. Hungary likely placed more 
emphasis on establishing a strong disaster warning and response system, but did not invest 
appropriately in undertaking preventive measures.  
For some scholars, industrial disasters must be analyzed through the lens of human rights. 
Morehouse believes that people have the right to know about the industrial hazards that pose a 
threat to their lives, and to participate in decisions concerning how these hazards are managed.30 
Perhaps it can be argued that it is the role of elected government to represent the interests of the 
people by ensuring that they are not exposed to the dangers of industrial hazards. The Hungarian 
government seems particularly accountable considering that there had been numerous warnings 
regarding the threat of the toxic sludge. The Clean Air Group (Levegõ Munkacsaport), an 
environmental organization, contends that it had warned the government for ten years that there 
were significant risks associated not only with the Ajka plant but also other storage reservoirs 
around the country. The reservoir that held the caustic waste was on the ICPDR’s 2006 watch list 
of over 150 industrial sites that were at risk for accidents that could contaminate the Danube.31 
More importantly, residents had long observed that the reservoir had surpassed its capacity, and 
complained about eminent disaster.32 It was not until after the disaster that the government began 
examining other factories in the area to ensure that a similar disaster was not on the horizon.33 
                                                 
29
 (2010, October 6). Disaster management situation, action taken, resources. Retrieved from 
http://redsludge.bm.hu/?paged=9. Also Dragoman, G. (2010, October 16). Seeing red in Hungary. The New York 
Times.  
30
 Morehouse, 1987, p. 23. 
31
 Rosenthal, E. (2010, October 7). Site in Hungary was listed as risky. The New York Times. 
32
 (2010, October 11). Homes, lives ruined by toxic spill. The Budapest Times.  
33
 (2010, October 12). Kolontár dike completed, engineers to check it today. Duna Televizio.  
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For journalist Gyorgy Dragoman, the disaster will likely lead to a reassessment of Hungary’s 
decades-long practice of storing toxic industrial waste throughout the country, and thus a 
political debate about why Hungarians once accepted such threats to their lives and their 
environment.34  
Herein lies a fundamental problem in assigning administrative and political 
accountability for this disaster to the current government in power. Vikor Orbán’s center-right 
Fidesz party came to power in April of this year, ousting the Hungarian Socialist Party, the 
Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP), that ruled the country over the past eight years.35 Many have 
analyzed the Hungarian red sludge disaster within the context of a broader historical trajectory 
affecting much of Eastern Europe. They believe that accidents are lurking on the horizon 
throughout the region. In fact, on January 30th 2000, an event similar to the red sludge disaster in 
Hungary occurred in Romania. About 100,000 cubic meters of waste water containing cyanide 
gushed out of a gold mine reservoir in the northwestern part of the country into tributaries of the 
Tisza, another major Central European river, threatening lives and environment all along the 
river’s route. A 2007 ICPDR study pinpointed 97 toxic industrial sites that had major 
contamination issues, with Hungary topping the list with 32 sites, Romania with 25, and 
Slovakia with 18.36 This is partly a legacy of Soviet-era development policy.  
Peter J. Hill documents the high-level of ecological devastation and deteriorating human 
health found once the Iron Curtain was lifted from over the region, bringing a number of startling 
facts to light. Children in parts of Poland were found to have five times more lead in their blood 
than their cohorts in Western Europe. In former East Germany, nearly 60% of the population was 
                                                 
34
 Dragoman, G. (2010, October 16). Seeing red in Hungary. The New York Times. 
35
 Bilefsky, D. (2010, April 25). Socialists in Hungary are ousted in elections. The New York Times.  
36
 Bilefsky, D. (2010, October 13). Besides Hungarian sludge, potential troubles lurk. The New York Times. Also 
Kanthak, J. (2000, April 12). The Baia Mare gold mine cyanide spill: causes, impacts and liability. Greenpeace 
International. Retrieved from: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/ACOS-64CNGF?OpenDocument. 
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maligned by respiratory ailments, with 4 out of 5 children in one particular city developing 
chronic bronchitis by seven years of age. Hill goes further to expose the destruction of two major 
Lakes as a result of Soviet planning. In 1957, the decision was made to locate paper mills on the 
shores of Lake Baikal in Russia due to its proximity to forests and the availability of large 
quantities of water it provided. Inevitably, the wastewater emanating from the pulp factories was 
discharged directly into the lake, contaminating a 23-mile area. The destruction of the Aral Sea is 
also instructive. Diversion of massive quantities of water from two rivers that fed the lake for 
irrigation projects to help the Soviet Union become self-sufficient in cotton production has led to 
its rapid reduction in size. Once larger than all but one of the Great Lakes, from 1960 to 1990 the 
area of the Aral Sea diminished 40% and its volume 66%.37  
This level of environmental degradation and human suffering was the result of a 
particular ideology that treated the socialist state as infallible. The legitimacy of the state was 
based on its claims of technical capacity and ability to provide and protect its people rather than 
on its accountability to them. In fact, official discourses often depicted society as an extended 
family, with the state playing a parental role over its citizen-children. In terms of the 
environment, “the ‘party-liner’ view, advocated by Party officials during the socialist era, viewed 
environmental problems as a problem of private greed and short-sightedness to be corrected by 
state ownership and central planning.”38 The people were not participants in the planning 
process, and thus did not have the right to know what the state was doing to the environment in 
the name of development. Often the actions of state-run corporations and communist 
governments were clouded by institutional opacity and bureaucratic closure. Essentially the 
                                                 
37
 Hill, P.J. 1992, pp. 321-322.  
38
 Harper, 2001, p. 119.  
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accountability frameworks that operate as checks on state power in democratic societies were 
virtually nonexistent throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.39  
Besides communist state policies, the movement towards free market capitalism in the 
1990s throughout the region shares blame for the lax regulation of industrial practices. For many 
people in Central Europe, the transition to a new political and economic reality was a negotiated 
process that largely excluded them.40 This seemed to be the case particularly with environmental 
regulation of business. Many environmentalists throughout the region began speaking of ‘wild 
capitalism’ and ‘eco-colonialism,’ referring to feelings that the recent political changes had 
opened the area to the importation of technologies in the name of development that had been 
rejected in the West as detrimental to both environmental and human safety. The general lack of 
environmental regulations, legislation, or public awareness of environmental issues meant the 
region was ripe for western European companies, multinational corporations, and domestic 
entrepreneurs to make profits. After 1989, any efforts by the state to regulate market forces were 
criticized as remnants of the previous totalitarian system. “If state socialism was mostly 
characterized by power through the incalculable, professionally ungrounded, and politically 
unchecked decisions of the state, the present is characterized by…power through the 
‘nondecisions’ of a fragmented state held in check by the private sector.”41 Hungary became 
simply one case of this new status quo. Again, profit making became ascendant over 
accountability to the public where state-planning once had been.  
The recent landslide victory of Orbán’s Fidesz party was a result of the failures of the 
Hungarian Socialist Party’s numerous neoliberal economic reforms, its general obsequious 
                                                 
39
 Harper, 2001, p. 119-120. 
40
 Smith, C.S. (2006, November 1). Memo from Hungary; from velvet to fringe in post-Soviet Central Europe. The 
New York Times. 
41
 Harper, 2005, pp. 229-230. 
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orientation towards corporate interests, and numerous corruption scandals surrounding former 
Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány’s government over the past eight years.42 Interestingly enough, 
the Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP), are not only successors of the communist party that ruled 
Hungary from 1956 to 1989, they were also responsible for many of the liberal free market 
policies implemented after the fall of Soviet-style Communism.43 “In eastern Europe capitalist 
transformation has been closely entwined from the start with ‘spontaneous privatization,’ the 
euphemism for the appropriation of state firms by socialist managers and other insiders.”44 Often 
the relationship between governments implementing the privatization of state-run enterprises and 
those acquiring them is one of collusion, thus removing the incentive for government to regulate 
these industries moving forward. When the history of the company responsible for the disaster in 
Hungary is examined in more detail later on in the paper, the numerous issues around 
establishing accountability will become clearer. In any case, the failure in government oversight 
regarding the safety of the aluminum plant cannot clearly be attributed to the current Fidesz 
party, but may instead be the legacy of unaccountable state-planning and conversely 
unaccountable privatization under democratically elected former-communists turned free market 
entrepreneurs.  
Also diluting the governments accountability for the oversight of the reservoir are holes 
in the E.U.’s regulatory framework. In order to join the E.U., Central and Eastern European 
countries were expected to invest heavily in cleaning up their environmental hazards. According 
to Mihaela Popovici, a former Romanian Environment Ministry official, environmental problems 
were often hidden due to fears of stalling integration into the E.U. “Other experts argued that the 
European Union, which is known globally for a cautious regulatory philosophy that often puts it 
                                                 
42
 Anievas, A. (2010, July 07). Less than revolutionary. The Budapest Times. 
43
 Ishiyama, 2000, pp. 881. Also Toole, 2003, p. 108.  
44
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at odds with industry, had nevertheless been too lax in monitoring and enforcing environmental 
rules in its new members states from the east.” Accession to the E.U. in 2004 created a false 
sense of security in terms of meeting environmental and industry regulation standards. In fact, 
MAL, the company responsible for the red sludge disaster, was given a permit in 2006 by the 
E.U. even after having been fined numerous times until 2003 for going beyond permissible levels 
of red sludge in its reservoirs. Though Hungary’s environmental laws had designated the red 
sludge as toxic, the E.U. regulations did not. Initially the E.U. sought to establish tough mining 
regulations, but the industry lobbied to prevent the red sludge from being declared toxic. When 
Hungary became part of the E.U., the standard was relaxed. The owners of MAL returned the 
focus on the Hungarian government, stressing that the company and its reservoir had been 
declared safe by government agency inspectors on September 23, only weeks before the 
reservoir wall collapsed.45 This finger-pointing between the Hungarian government and E.U. 
officials displays the lack of clarity in regards to who is responsible for regulating industries 
engaged in hazardous conduct, which makes determining who is to be held accountable by the 
public quite murky.  
 
Company Faces Questions of Criminal and Financial Accountability  
Where the government had been successful in both responding to the disaster and 
effectively communicating to the public, the company responsible for the reservoir, Magyar 
Alumínium Termelo és Kereskedelmi Zrt (MÁL Zrt), was a complete failure. It waited nearly 24 
hours after it was clear that a disaster had occurred to issue a statement. The director of the 
company, Zoltán Bakonyi, told the media that “there was ‘no need to fear’ because the materials 
were ‘in no way dangerous or harmful.’ He likened the red mud…to ‘paint’ that could be easily 
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washed off.”46 This was despite the fact that hundreds of people had been transported to hospitals 
because of serious burns and irritations due to contact with the material. The company argued 
that the reason it did not consider the sludge hazardous was because it had not been classified as 
such under EU regulations. The company offered 10,000 forints or $510 to compensate each 
family affected by the disaster, earning the contempt of the public.47 For Morehouse, companies 
bear the primary responsibility for managing their hazardous material. “The first line of defense 
in coping with industrial hazards lies in industry itself.  A company making a hazardous product 
or using a hazardous process is almost certain…to know more about that product or process than 
anyone else,” which makes Bakonyi’s statements about the sludge highly problematic.48 
 What also becomes an issue is determining culpability for the disaster itself. How could 
Bakonyi and MÁL Zrt not know that the reservoir was vulnerable to a breach? A resident, 
“Róbert Léhmann, told MTI [the Hungarian news agency] that the owners of the alumina plant 
must have known the dam was about to break. He demanded to know why the villages had not 
been alerted and told to leave.”49 Immediately after the disaster, efforts to determine fault 
emerged. Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán made a statement the day after the wall was 
breached that the spill was likely caused by human error. “We do not know of any sign which 
indicates that this disaster would have natural causes,” Orbán said. “And if a disaster has no 
natural causes, then it can be considered a disaster caused by people.”50 MAL countered the 
Prime Minister’s claim by declaring that there was never a sign that the reservoir was going to 
collapse, and that the northern wall’s failure was the result of heavy rains overloading the 
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 (2010, October 12). Anger against firm in wake of disaster. The Budapest Times.  
47
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reservoirs capacity, thus making the event a natural disaster. On October 7th, Orbán stated that he 
was skeptical of the alumina company’s claims, and that a reservoir like that one does not simply 
collapse but likely deteriorated over time.51 On the same day the government’s website made it 
known that Hungary’s National Investigation Bureau would open a criminal inquiry examining 
whether the company operating the reservoir followed all regulations and conducted all 
necessary inspections. The government’s position was that the tragedy was not a natural disaster, 
but the result of human negligence.52 The government seized corporate documents to determine 
whether the reservoir was professionally built and utilized.53 According to Duna Televizio, one 
of Hungary’s two public television stations, several YouTube videos prior to the rupture depict 
the general poor state of the reservoir with rusted and seemingly unstable walls.54  
 On October 11th, Bakonyi was arrested on charges of criminal negligence leading to a 
public catastrophe, with the Hungarian PM arguing that the disaster was a mater of placing profit 
over the safety of people. “There’s probable cause to suspect that there were persons who had 
been aware of the dangerous weakening of the storage pond walls,’ Prime Minister Viktor Orbán 
said, ‘but they thought, because of their private interests, that it was not worth mending them and 
hoped the disaster wouldn’t happen.’”55 If convicted, Bakonyi could have faced a sentence of up 
to 10 years. The government’s actions against Bakonyi seem to fit the framework for what 
Bovens calls hierarchical accountability, whereby one individual is held responsible to account 
for the actions of the company. “The process of accounting begins at the top. It is the CEO or 
commander in chief who assumes complete responsibility and thus is held accountable in 
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external forum.” This is because all the lower members of the organization or institution are 
accountable internally to their superiors. If subordinates’ inappropriate actions lead to 
detrimental consequences outside of the institution, it is the fault of the organization’s leaders 
because they did not hold those they have authority over accountable. “The process of 
accountability [therefore] occurs within the strict lines of the ‘chain of command.’”56  
That same day legislation was drafted and voted upon that would legalize the government 
seizure of the MAL as a result of the emergency situation. National Directorate General for 
Disaster Management chief, Gyorgy Bakondi, was declared disaster relief commissioner and 
placed in charge of the company. The government believed that it was necessary for the plant to 
be reopened because lack of operation would mean billions of forints of damage to generators 
and other vital equipment. The plant was deemed an essential component of the local economy, 
employing over 1,100 people. When suppliers and trickle-down effects were taken into 
consideration, its economic contribution was believed to be even greater.57 On October 16th the 
plant was reopened.58  The government must have made a calculation that it would potentially be 
held accountable for deteriorating economic conditions whether or not decline was a result of the 
disaster and not failed government policies. 
 
Politics Place Doubt on Process of Establishing Corporate Accountability 
While Orbán’s actions seem somewhat appropriate considering the extent of the disaster 
and the likelihood of the company’s negligence, unfortunately they are ensconced within a 
broader narrative that places doubt on the claim that the government was simply seeking to 
establish accountability. One lens through which the government’s actions can be analyzed is 
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that which depicts Orbán and his ruling coalition as right-wing nationalists. According to 
reporter Alexander Anievas of the Budapest Times, the Fidesz leaders have sought to use 
nationalism as a means to gain greater shares of the national vote. In one instance, the 
government called for all public institutions to display a ‘statement of national cooperation’ no 
smaller than 50 by 70 centimeters.59 The takeover of MAL is represented as the first steps 
towards renationalizing previously state-owned industries, with Orbán positioning himself as 
fighting for the public against corporate power and greed. Since the fall of Soviet communism 
and the ascendancy of supposedly free market economics, large domestic and foreign 
multinational corporations have used their leverage over the economy to block legislation 
unfavorable to their interests. The Orbán regime plans on launching a series of major taxes 
targeting these economic entities, amounting to nearly 360 billion forints or 1.3 billion Euros in 
the next year. “Prime Minister Viktor Orbán wants to see an end to the earlier set-up of the 
influential economic players calling all the shots…From now on the government will establish 
the rules of play when it comes to regulating the economy.”60 Peter Rona, a Hungarian 
economist, views these actions as a power grab in which Orbán is using every possible 
opportunity to concentrate economic and political power in the hands of the government.61 For 
some, the tough action taken against MAL’s owners is simply part of a political ploy to 
galvanize support for the regime. 
Another narrative that is tangential to the previous one focuses on the political rivalry 
between Orbán and the outgoing Hungarian Socialist Party Prime Minister, Ferenc Gyurcsány. 
When the history of the company in question is analyzed, and its links to Gyurcsány are 
illuminated, questions about the neutrality of the government’s actions become necessary. 
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During communism, the aluminum industry was one of the most productive sectors of the 
economy, which made the government’s assets in this sector quite attractive for company 
managers and others with political ties during the transition towards a free market economy. 
These companies became prime targets for ‘spontaneous privatization,’ propelling those able to 
finagle their way into owning these assets into positions of great wealth. Árpád Bakonyi, father 
of the arrested Zoltán Bakonyi, was one of those individuals, amassing a fortune of 16.5 billion 
forints, making him the 28th richest individual in Hungary.62 According to New York Times 
reporter Dan Bilefsky, the arrest of the younger Bakonyi “reveals the complex intersections of 
business and politics within the state companies that were privatized in a rush in the 1990s.” 
Bakonyi, the elder, happens to also be business associates with the recently departed PM 
Gyurcsány.63 In three companies which Gyurcsány has ties to, Mosonmagyaróvar’s Motim, 
Bauxit Banyavegyonkezelo Kft, and Elso Magyar Timfoldipari Kft, Bakonyi has been identified 
as having partial ownership stakes. After the disaster, Zoltan Bakonyi revealed to the press that a 
company belonging to Gyurcsány was a supplier to the plant where the disaster occurred. “The 
story of Mal would seem to be a classic example of ‘red capitalism,’ in which former communist 
apparatchiks (and their offspring) become business titans while retaining deep ties to their old 
networks on the political left.”64 The new Prime Minister, Orbán, has publicly vowed to take 
action against what he has called the ‘oligarchs,’ businessmen like Bakonyi who used political 
collusion and corruption to get rich.65  
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When assessing what Bovens refers to as the procedural adequacy of the government’s 
actions against Bakonyi, Orbán’s orientation towards MAL and his political agenda present a 
number of problems. The immediate actions of the government seem to violate the notions of 
due process and proper judgment procedures outlined in Bovens’ work. The government did not 
give the actor, Bakonyi, sufficient opportunity to explain and justify his conduct. Emphasis was 
placed on passing judgment before a case had been made. It is also debatable whether or not the 
government could even pass sound judgment on the situation considering that it is not an 
independent neutral party. The government’s initial arrest of Bakonyi and subsequent charges do 
not seem to meet the minimum requirements of an accountability procedure.66  
The courts speedy release of Bakonyi seems to support this line of reasoning. On October 
12, a judge dismissed government demands that Bakonyi be charged with negligence because the 
prosecutors could not demonstrate that he had not established adequate emergency warning and 
rescue plans. His lawyers claimed that MAL had plans approved by government authorities and 
that there were no incriminating testimonies against Bakonyi by employees.67 On October 19, the 
Veszprém County Court upheld the decision by the lower court, but new charges of reckless 
endangerment that led to a fatal accident were brought up against Bakonyi by the government.68  
On October 20th the lawyer Gyorgy Lehmann offered to launch a class action lawsuit against 
MAL in the name of the government, seeking 23 billion forints to cover property damages, 
clean-up of the contaminated river, and construction of the dike after the disaster. This amount is 
separate from what he believes the company owes residents in compensation. Lehmann believed 
that it was in everyone’s interests to proceed with the lawsuit as soon as possible. “He argues that 
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the clean-up efforts, which are currently being paid for by the state and by donations from the 
public, should come from the coffers of Mal Zrt., and by waiting to sue in the future, this cost is 
being placed unfairly on groups who shouldn’t have to pay.”69 On November 5th, the government 
made an announcement that compensation procedures would be initiated against the company for 
causing the accident. This elicited a retort from MAL the next day contending that the 
government had unconscionably laid responsibility for the disaster on the company before final 
expert opinions or court rulings had been finalized. MAL’s legal representative argued that this 
was without precedent.70 The hastiness with which charges against Mal were pushed by the 
government has seemed to highlight the political undertones of the situation, tainting the process 
of establishing the company’s accountability for the disaster. 
 
General Difficulties Holding Corporations Accountable for Disaster 
 Beyond the politics marring the legal process in Hungary, broader issues related to 
determining such accountability in industrial disasters abound. According to Bovens, legal 
accountability should be a straightforward process. It generally involves clearly delineated 
responsibilities legally bestowed upon a clearly identified authority figure. The process of 
determining legal accountability is generally based on detailed legal standards defined by civil, 
penal, or administrative statutes.71 Others believe that this clarity becomes muddled in cases 
involving industrial accidents. They make a particular distinction between traditional criminal 
law and regulatory criminal law, and how the latter is often enforced quite differently from the 
former in ways that make determining blame and meting out appropriate sanctions particularly 
problematic. “This kind of regulatory criminal law is seen by some as quasi-criminal, falling 
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within a nebulous ‘public welfare’ category, and for this reason seen as second in force and 
power and distinct in meaning from traditional criminal law.”72 The case of the cyanide spill in 
Romania is instructive.  
It was clear that many questions had been raised regarding the safety of the Baia Mare 
dam prior to the disaster in 2000. In 1999 Romanian authorities had made the management of the 
mine aware of such risks after former employees came forward to reveal that there were serious 
problems with the construction of the reservoir. Rather than being constructed with rock 
materials, the walls were constructed using high quantities of sand material, thus increasing the 
probability of leaks. In autumn of that year, five cows in a village near the reservoir died after a 
leak from the gold mine’s pipe system. That winter a deputy from another neighboring town 
reported an additional breach in the wall. After the catastrophic spill the following year, the 
Romanian government and the owners claimed that record high temperatures were responsible 
for the conditions that caused the dam to rupture.73 Aural SA, the German financed joint venture 
between a private Australian and a state-owned Romanian mining company, fought vigorously to 
avoid liability for the devastation. Inevitably the company was only fined $166 by the 
government because it was deemed to be in compliance with Romanian regulatory standards.74 
Recall that a similar argument was being brought forward by MAL in Hungary. On October 27th, 
the first independent investigation into the disaster, commissioned by MAL, came to the 
conclusion that the breach was due to slippage in the soil below the reservoir, an unforeseen 
circumstance that the company could not predict or control.75 On November 16, a Hungarian 
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newspaper, Népszabadság uncovered documents that the Inspectorate for Environment, Nature 
and Water may have given official sanction to the company to fill the reservoir beyond its 
structural limits.76  
 
Conclusion 
When Hungarian public opinion was gauged, it was made clear that the people were 
nearly in full support of the Orbán administration’s actions. The polling agency Szazadveg found 
that 86% of the population believed that the government handled the red sludge disaster either 
excellently or well. Nearly the same percentage of people agreed with the government’s decision 
to take control of the company’s assets, while 70% lay responsibility for the failed reservoir wall 
on MAL.77 Analyzing the case of the Hungarian red sludge disaster using Bovens’ various 
accountability frameworks, it is evident that the Hungarian government was rather successful in 
responding to the disaster and communicating its actions to the public, which explains why it 
received such high evaluations in the forum of public opinion. While the Orbán administration’s 
actions in terms of holding MAL accountable criminally and economically seemed to fall short 
of meeting the minimal requirements of an accountability procedure, they were very popular 
with the public. It is probably the case that failing to act aggressively against the company, while 
meeting standards of fairness and justice, would likely have hurt the administration politically. 
The high level of public support for the government’s actions in this regard make this evident. 
Bovens’ makes the claim that it is often the case that accountability of one form will likely 
conflict with accountability of another. An accountability arrangement may be judged as 
adequate and beneficial from one perspective, but insufficient and detrimental from another. 
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Therefore, establishing accountability arrangements is primarily about determining what 
standards society seeks to uphold and enforce.78  
Another element that must be taken into account is whether or not, moving forward, the 
government of Hungary will engage in disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures to prevent 
another industrial disaster like the recent one. For Olson et al. there are host of problems with 
establishing accountability for DRR that makes this unlikely. First, there are often no forums to 
which government is accountable to explain its DRR actions because generally formal 
accountability measures exist for bad decisions rather than non-decisions. While the recent 
disaster in Hungary may place DRR on the agenda in the short term, neither the public nor the 
media are likely to sustain the long-term focus necessary to reduce vulnerabilities that are 
imbedded in the country’s complex structural and historical legacies. The fact that reducing risks 
to disaster requires a number of actors both in government and the private sector also makes 
assigning blame for disasters when they occur problematic. While in the case of Hungary’s toxic 
spill responsibility seems rather straightforward, in reality, a number of actors, over an extended 
period of time, played a role in fostering the environment that resulted in the ecological disaster. 
And finally, though disasters bring the question of accountability to the forefront of society’s 
thoughts, often establishing clear DRR-accountability is clouded by attempts by potentially 
responsible parties to pass blame onto one another.79 This seems to be the case in Hungary’s 
recent disaster, thus decreasing the likelihood that systematic DRR framework will be 
established and implemented by the government to adequately address the country’s risk to 
industrial disaster.  
 
                                                 
78
 Bovens, 2006, p. 30. 
79
 Olson et al., 2011, p. 63. 
Hungarian Toxic Red Sludge Spill 
 
 25 
Bibliography 
 
Anievas, A. (2010, July 07). Less than revolutionary. The Budapest Times. 
 
Anievas, A. (2010, July 20). The new party state, Fidesz style. The Budapest Times. 
 
Bilefsky, D. (2010, April 25). Socialists in Hungary are ousted in elections. The New York Times.  
 
Bilefsky, D. (2010 October 10). Fears of more red sludge in Hungary. The New York Times. 
 
Bilefsky, D. (2010, October 11). Hungary arrests official, citing role in red sludge. The New York 
Times. 
 
Bilefsky, D. (2010, October 13). Besides Hungarian sludge, potential troubles lurk. The New 
York Times.  
 
Bovens, M. (2006). Analysing and assessing public accountability: A conceptual framework. 
European Governance Papers (EUROGOV), 1-37. 
 
Cruz, C., & Seleny, A. (2002). Reform and counterreform: the path to market in Hungary and 
Cuba. Comparative Politics, 34(2), 211-231. 
 
D’Amato, E. (2010, October 8). The murky business behind Hungary’s red sludge crisis. 
Realdeal.hu. Retrieved from http://www.realdeal.hu/20101008/the-murky-business-behind-
hungarys-red-sludge-crisis. 
 
Dragoman, G. (2010, October 16). Seeing red in Hungary. The New York Times.  
 
Farazmand, A. (2007). Learning from the Katrina crisis: a global and international perspective 
with implications for future crisis management. Public Administration Review, 67(1), 149-159. 
 
Garnett, J. L., & Kouzmin, A. (2007). Communicating throughout Katrina: competing and 
complementary conceptual lenses on crisis communication. Public Administration Review, 67(1), 
171-188. 
 
Gorondi, P. (2010, October 13). Zoltan Bakonyi: Hungary sludge flood CEO released from jail 
without charges. The Huffington Post.  
Hungarian Toxic Red Sludge Spill 
 
 26 
 
Hall, A., Johnstone, R., & Ridgway, A. (2004). Reflection on reforms: developing criminal 
accountability for industrial deaths. National Research Center for Occupational Health and 
Safety, 26, 1-104. 
 
Harper, K. M. (2001). Chernobyl stories and antropological shock in Hungary. Anthropological 
Quarterly, 74(3), 114-123. 
 
Harper, K. M. (2005). 'Wild capitalism' and 'ecocolonialism': a tale of two rivers. American 
Anthropologist, 105.2, 221-233. 
 
Hill, P. J. (1992). Environmental problems under socialism. Cato Journal, 12(2), 321-335. 
 
Hodgson, R. (2010, October 18). Flip-flop on red mud spill plant re-opening. The Budapest 
Times 
 
Ishiyama, J. (2000). Candidate Recruitment, Party Organization and the Communist Successor 
Parties: the case of MSzP, the KPRF, and the LDDP. Europe-Asia Studies, 52(5), 875-896.  
 
Kanthak, J. (2000, April 12). The Baia Mare gold mine cyanide spill: causes, impacts and 
liability. Greenpeace International. Retrieved from: 
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/ACOS-64CNGF?OpenDocument. 
 
Morehouse, W. (1987). Citizen, worker, and state: the search for new paradigms in coping with 
industrial crisis. Organization Environment, 1(3), 22-33. 
 
Olson, R.S., Sarmiento, J.P., & Hoberman, G. (2011). Establishing public accountability, 
speaking truth to power and inducing political will for disaster risk reduction: ‘Ochos Rios + 25’. 
Environmental Hazards, 10, 59-68. 
 
Padgett, T. (01 March 2010). Chile: prepared for the quake but not the tsunami. Time. 
 
Rosenthal, E. (2010, October 7). Site in Hungary was listed as risky. The New York Times. 
 
Hungarian Toxic Red Sludge Spill 
 
 27 
Smith, C.S. (2006, November 1). Memo from Hungary; from velvet to fringe in post-Soviet 
Central Europe. The New York Times. 
 
Toole, J. (2003). Straddling the East-West Divide: Party Organization and Communist Legacies 
in East Central Europe. Europe-Asia Studies, 55(1), 101-118. 
 
(2010, March 6). Chile sacks oceanography chief over failure to issue tsunami warnings. The 
Telegraph. 
 
(2010, October 5). Hungary declares emergency after red sludge spill. Reuters.  
 
(2010, October 5). Sludge flood—Four dead include children. Retrieved from 
http://redsludge.bm.hu/?paged=9. 5:26 pm. 
  
(2010, October 6). Disaster management situation, action taken, resources. Retrieved from 
http://redsludge.bm.hu/?paged=9. Also Dragoman, G. (2010, October 16). Seeing red in 
Hungary. The New York Times.  
 
(2010, October 06). Huge ammonia spill paints towns red as a state of emergency is declared in 
three counties. Duna Televizio. 
 
(2010, October 7). Information on the accidental pollution and related mitigation measures of the 
‘red mud spill at Ajka.’ Retrieved from http://redsludge.bm.hu/?paged=9.  
 
(2010, October 7). Information on the state of the rivers in Hungary. Retrieved from 
http://redsludge.bm.hu/?p=21#more-21.  
 
(2010, October 7). Report for the international press. Retrieved from 
http://redsludge.bm.hu/?paged=9. 
 
(2010, October 7). The Hungarian government uses coordinated efforts in red sludge disaster 
recovery. Ministry of Public Administration and Justice. Retrieved from 
http://www.kim.gov.hu/english/activities/briefing/20101008_an4.html 
 
(2010, October 07). Viktor Orbán visits Kolontár and Devecser to meet with locals. Duna 
Televizio. 
 
(2010, October 8). A deadly deluge. The Economist.  
 
(2010, October 11). “Homes, lives ruined by toxic spill.” The Budapest Times. 
  
(2010 October 11). The reservoir at Kolontár cannot be saved. Duna Televizio. 
 
(2010, October 12). Anger against firm in wake of disaster. The Budapest Times.  
Hungarian Toxic Red Sludge Spill 
 
 28 
 
(2010, October 12). Kolontár dike completed, engineers to check it today. Duna Televizio.  
 
(2010, October 12). Redsludge dot com. The Budapest Times. 
 
(2010, October 14). Waltzing with disaster: the Danube basin is littered with accidents waiting to 
happen. The Economist. 
 
(2010, October 16). Hungary spill plant reopens. Aljazeera. 
 
(2010, October 19). Survey shows Hungarians satisfied with government handling red sludge 
disaster. MTI 
 
(2010, October 19). Zoltán Bakonyi is still a free man. Duna Televizio. 
 
(2010, October 20). A Siófok lawyer wants to sue Mal Zrt for 23 billion forints. Duna Televizio. 
 
(2010, October 27). Was the red sludge catastrophe caused by a sinkhole or slippage? Duna 
Televizio. 
 
(2010, November 11). Company faulted in sludge flood says government blame too early. MTI. 
  
(2010, November 16). Was the reservoir filled beyond its capacity with an official ‘blessing?’ 
Duna Televizio.  
 
(2010, November 22). Pressure groups left flat-footed. The Budapest Times.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
